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Introductio
For genocide prevention specialists, rapidly unfolding events and shifting violence patterns
complicate efforts to understand, trace, and respond to this extreme social phenomenon.
Devising policy-oriented frameworks structured enough to organize chaotic, complex events
but exible enough for cross-cultural variation requires analysts to thread the needle between
speed and accuracy. Drawing from my experience in both genocide prevention policy and
research, I suggest that answers to two key conceptual debates within comparative genocide
studies are needed to advance genocide and mass atrocity analytic tools: 1) What are the core
features that distinguish genocides from other forms of violence?1 and 2) how can we trace
genocidal patterns within larger processes of unfolding violence?2
To circumvent unproductive de nitional arguments, some scholars have suggested
methodologies that analyze large-scale violence (genocide and other) according to numerically
based thresholds.3 Primarily quantitative, these methodologies represent the eld’s undeniable
growth in epistemological sophistication,4 while answering certain aspects of the genocide
puzzle. However, victim threshold-based methodologies are limited in their ability to
incorporate cross-cultural variation and—relatedly—to guide the design of speci c,
contextually tailored violence interventions in real-time. To address this need, I operationalize
other scholars’ conceptual innovations to present a methodology grounded in two areas of
scholarly consensus regarding what separates genocides from other large-scale violence: who is
targeted (intended target) and for what purpose (intended purpose).5 In doing so, I demonstrate
that the dynamics of genocidal and other violence can be mapped as they unfold, including as
their characteristics evolve in the context of their broader occurrence
Current violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and eastern Ukraine underscores the
relationship between historical events and modern victims, with Joseph Stalin’s unilateral
boundary demarcations and ethnic population resettlement programs respectively in uencing
these contemporary con icts. As a historical, contested instance of mass violence, the 1932–1933

1

Scott Straus, “‘Destroy Them to Save Us:’ Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012), 551–555; Ernesto Verdeja, “The Political Science of Genocide: Outlines of an
Emerging Research Agenda,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012), 311–313.

2

Verdeja, Political Science, 308.

3

The following exempli es this trend and its value. See Matthew Krain, “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and
Severity of Genocides and Politicides,” The Journal of Con ict Resolution 41, no. 3 (1997), 331–360; Barbara Harff,
“No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,”
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 57–73; Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and
Genocide in the 20th Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Alex Bellamy, “Mass Atrocities and Armed
Con ict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Protect,” The Stanley Foundation Policy Brief,
February 2011, accessed September 1, 2019, 1–4, https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/
BellamyPAB22011.pdf.

4

Scott Straus, “Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007), 476–478; Verdeja,
Political Science, 307–308.

5

Straus, Destroy Them, 552–553.
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Holodomor—an arti cially induced famine in Stalin’s Soviet Ukraine6 which killed an
estimated 3.9 to 5 million people7—is ripe for its extensive documentation to be analyzed from a
comparative genocide framework. The Holodomor is one of the more widely explored
examples of Soviet famines within Eastern European studies (with some emerging social science
scholarship).8 Legal scholars have utilized this case study to question genocidal statutes of
limitations9 and the overlap of actus reus (the action which constituted the crime) and mens rea
(the knowledge or intent of wrongdoing).10 Still, the Holodomor case has thus far had a less
signi cant impact on broader comparative genocide theorizing of how mass violence unfolds or
can be prevented. I focus on this research gap, using the Holodomor to demonstrate that chaotic
patterns of violence can be empirically organized with the most important dynamics for
prevention policy decision-making ampli ed. Drawing on all available archival sources, I code
the 1932–1933 correspondences directly to and from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin regarding
Ukraine to display how decision-making shifted in the two areas of intended targets and
purpose. The ability of this framework to detect change over time and the correlation of the two
key violence characteristics originally suggested by Straus11 is signi cant, indicating these
approaches can be applied to empirically organize patterns in other mass killings. As my work
demonstrates the emergence of genocidal criteria in the Holodomor, my framework ultimately
concurs with other scholars who have labeled the Holodomor a genocide.12

6

Many historians include the Kuban region, which although held by the Russian republic’s Northern Caucasus
province, was mainly populated by Ukrainians.

7

Signi cant demographic analyses on Holodomor deaths include the following works. See Oleh Wolowyna et al.,
“Monthly Distribution of 1933 Famine Losses in Soviet Ukraine and the Russia Soviet Republic at the Regional
Level.” Nationalities Paper 48, no. 3 (2020), 530–548; Nataliia Levchuk et al., “Regional 1932–1933 Famine Losses: A
Comparative Analysis of Ukraine and Russia,” Nationalities Papers 48, no. 3 (2020), 492, 510; Harvard Ukrainian
Research Institute (HURI), “The Great Famine Project,” MAPA: Digital Atlas of Ukraine, 2018, accessed January 1,
2020, http://gis.huri.harvard.edu/historical-atlas/the-great-famine.html; Omelian Rudnytskyi et al.,
“Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe: The Case of Massive Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933,” Canadian
Studies in Population 42, no. 1–2 (2015), 53; Oleh Wolowyna, “Demographic Dimensions of the 1932–33 Famine in
Ukraine,” in Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933: Genocide by Other Means, eds. Taras Hunczak and Roman Serbyn (New
York: Shevchenko Scienti c Society, 2007), 98–114; Oleh Wolowyna, “Comments on the Demographic
Consequences of the Holodomor,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1–4 (2008), 243–IX; Jacques Vallin et al., “The
Great Famine: Population Losses in Ukraine,” in Holodomor Re ections on the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet
Ukraine, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Lisa Grekul (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 2008), 35–46; Norman M. Naimark,
Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 70–79; Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin’s War on
Ukraine (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2017).

8

Arturas Rozenas and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by
Hunger,’” American Political Science Review 113, no. 2 (2019), 569–583.

9

Myroslava Antonovych, “Legal Accountability for the Holodomor-Genocide of 1932–1933 (Great Famine) in Ukraine,”
Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal 1, no. 1 (2015), 159.

10

Andriy Semotiuk, “The Ukrainian Holodomor—Was It a Genocide?,” Famine-Genocide in Ukraine (2008), 1–7, accessed
September 1, 2019, https://myworkvisa.com/usa/downloads/Holodomor.pdf.

11

Straus, Destroy Them, 552–553.

12

For scholarly works labeling the Holodomor a genocide, see Andrea Graziosi, “The Soviet 1931–1933 Famines and the
Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a New Interpretation Possible, and What Would the Consequences Be?,” Harvard
Ukrainian Studies 27, no. 1 (2004), 106–109; Nicolas Werth, “The Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933,” Mass
Violence and Resistance, 2008, accessed August 20, 2019, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacreresistance/en/document/great-ukrainian-famine-1932-33; Nicolas Werth, “The Crimes of the Stalin Regime:
Outline for an Inventory and Classi cation,” in The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave,
2008), 406–408, 414–415; Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 15–29, 70–79; Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, eds. The
Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian
Studies Press, 2012), xlii–xliv; George O. Liber, Total Wars and the Making of Ukraine, 1914–1954 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2016), 192–197. Of historical interest, Raphaël Lemkin labeled the Ukrainian case a genocide in a
1953 essay, calling it “perhaps the classic example of Soviet genocide, its longest and broadest experiment in
Russi cation, the destruction of the Ukrainian nation,” quoted in Roman Serbyn, “Lemkin on Genocide of
Nations,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7, no. 1 (2009), 126.
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Historical Context of the Holodomor and Scope of Researc
Striking for its devastatingly short time span, the Holodomor (“killing by hunger”) resulted in
every eighth person in Ukraine perishing from 1932 to 1934.13 These events took place within
the larger context of persistent Soviet famines, including the 1932-1933 all-Union famines that
killed millions across the grain-producing areas of the North Caucasus, Volga region,
Kazakhstan, Western Siberia, and the South Urals.14 Despite many debated aspects, commonly
suggested contributing factors to the all-Union famines include the forced, often-violent
collectivization accompanying the 1928 implementation of Stalin’s rst ve-year plan aimed at
industrial revitalization (replacing Vladimir Lenin’s New Economic Policy of the early 1920s),
grain requisitions, over-rapid economic transformation, agricultural workforce issues (e.g.,
decreasing laborers, forced transition of Kazakh herding practices),15 and weather conditions.
Foundational food security research states the “inescapable” conclusion that modern famines,
“despite the role of [contributing] natural causes…are man-made,” as they are primarily driven
by issues of food access.16 This subject’s more profound debates therefore question not whether
the Holodomor and other Soviet famines were arti cially induced, but 1) the degree of willful
violence, as opposed to deadly incompetence, and 2) the presence of group-speci c targeting.
Focusing this analysis on Stalin’s intentionality in the Ukrainian case, I note Liber’s data
demonstrating a 1930 tenfold increase in collectivization-driven peasant rebellions across the
Soviet Union, with 30 percent occurring in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).17
Ukrainian lands experienced a deadly combination of grain requisitions; unworkable grain
quotas; denial of requested food aid; seizure and destruction of food, seeds (the foundation of
the following year’s harvest), and agricultural equipment; infamous black boards where
villages were sealed to prevent hunger-driven out-migration; and the capture of eeing
peasants from train stations by soldiers who pursued and returned them to their desolated
villages.18 Some of these dynamics were also present in other Soviet famines. However,
Kulchytsky19 argues that while the Holodomor was linked to broader Soviet socioeconomic
policies, it constituted a unique genocidal variant within the Stalinist regime’s broader lethal
policies.20 Despite all-Union attempts by Lenin and Stalin to “Sovietize”—i.e., transform
economic and sociocultural identities—the countryside, Kulchytsky highlights four overlapping
dynamics as demonstrating Ukrainian-speci c targeting: physical blockades, seizure of all food,
selective aid, and informational censure. These injurious directives coincided with Stalin’s
termination of existing Ukrainization policies, while also attacking Ukrainian party units.21

13

Serhii Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 253.

14

For a variety of interpretations, see R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture,
1931–1933 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Michael Ellman, “Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932–1933
Revisited,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 4 (2007), 663–693; Hiroaki Kuromiya, “The Soviet Famine of 1932–1933
Reconsidered,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 4 (2008), 663–675.

15

For Kazakhstan famine details, see Sarah Cameron, The Hungry Steppe: Famine, Violence, and the Making of Soviet
Kazakhstan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

16

Nevin S. Scrimshaw, “The Phenomenon of Famine,” Annual Review of Nutrition 71, no. 1 (1987), 1. For an analysis of
the political causes of famine, see Stephen Devereux, “Introduction: From ‘Old Famines’ to ‘New Famines’” in The
New Famines: Why Famines Persist in an Era of Globalization, eds. Stephen Devereux (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1–
26. For another seminal work in famine studies, see Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and
Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

17

Liber, Total Wars, 147.

18

Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 175–305; Werth, Great Ukrainian Famine; Graziosi, Soviet Famines, 97–115;
Applebaum, Red Famine, 186–277.

19

In the 1980s, Stanislav Kulchytsky was one of the rst Ukrainian historians to study the Holodomor, rst describing it
as an unintentional outcome of collectivization but evolving considerably in his views after 1991.

20

Stanislav Kulchytsky, The Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: An Anatomy of the Holodomor, trans. Ali Kinsella (Toronto:
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2018), 49–128.

21

Plokhy, Gates of Europe, 254.
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Multiple scholars have argued that Soviet authorities could have saved between 5 million22 to
7.8 million23 lives by diverting huge quantities of grain exports to famine-impacted territories,
with Medvedev concluding “only half of the grain that was exported in 1932-1933 would have
been suf cient to save all the southern regions from famine.”24 As Ukrainian lands—especially
in the eastern, southern, and central regions of Ukraine’s modern boundaries—were
depopulated due to the fatalities, Soviet records show organized campaigns to repopulate these
lands with ethnic Russians and other Soviet citizens by late 1933.25 Going beyond the Soviet
Union’s documented history of deportations and population resettlements, ethnic Russians also
lled Soviet Ukraine’s institutions to bolster the Ukrainian Communistic Party: by January of
1934, only four out of twelve members of the Ukrainian Communist Party Politburo were
Ukrainians.26 In addition to social engineering and political institution takeover, the Holodomor
resulted in a physically weakened, deeply traumatized populace, “crushing its capacity for
open resistance to the regime for generations to come.”27 Using hunger as a weapon of violence,
Stalin managed to transform a Ukrainian national movement that declared an independent
statehood from 1917 to 1921 into an “exemplary Soviet republic” as he wrote in a letter to a
close associate.28
Harsh repressions and informational blockades have contributed to Holodomor
controversies today. References to “food dif culties” only appeared in Soviet scholarship in
1956, with the word “famine” itself not appearing until 1987.29 When considering other works
that have addressed the question of genocide in the 1932–1933 Holodomor, I carefully weighed
dissenting views. Some historiographies view 1932–1933 as an arti cial separation from broader
chronological dynamics or other Ukrainian famines in the 1920s, late 1930s, or post-World War
II. Another debate probes whether governmental grain seizures can accurately be interpreted as
a form of annihilating violence, a question hanging over other Soviet famines as well. Here,
Rosenberg and Silina provide a relevant counterpoint in their detailed analysis of why
starvation, with its slow and dehumanizing destruction, deserves special recognition within
legal de nitions of genocidal violence.30 Furthermore, Davies and Wheatcroft have blamed the
Ukrainian famine on gross bureaucratic incompetence, saying, “the story which has emerged is
of a Soviet leadership which was struggling with a famine crisis which had been caused partly
by their wrongheaded policies, but was unexpected and undesirable.”31 Contestations as to
whether grain requisitions constitute willful violence evoke debates involving the methods of
mass deaths in other contested genocide cases including various Native American
experiences.32 I concur with other scholarship stressing the intention of the violence over the
various methods by which it can be achieved.33 In describing conceptual challenges regarding
intentionality, Verdeja suggests “emergent intentionality” and “cascading radicalization” as

22

Ellman, Stalin and the Soviet Famine, 679.

23

Kuromiya, Soviet Famine, 665.

24

Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989), 243.

25

Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 262.

26

Applebaum, Red Famine, 291.

27

Plokhy, Gates of Europe, 254.

28

Ibid.

29

Andrea Graziosi et al., “Introduction to After the Holodomor: The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine on Ukraine,”
Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1 (2008), xv.

30

Sheri Rosenberg and Everita Silina, “Genocide by Attrition: Slow and Ef cient,” in Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues
and Emerging Perspectives, eds. Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (New York: Routledge, 2013), 106–126.

31

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 441.

32

For a summary of these debates, see Benjamin Madley, “Reexamining the American Genocide Debate: Meaning,
Historiography, and New Methods,” American Historical Review 120, no. 1 (2015), 98–139.

33

Verdeja, Political Science, 309–312; Straus, Destroy Them, 550–552.
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more productive.34 He notes that assumptions of prior explicit intentionality prove problematic
for many well-accepted cases like the Holocaust, Armenia, and Rwanda35—a point applicable to
debates over whether Stalin caused or capitalized on existing hunger to achieve more
pronounced destruction. Taking a similar approach, Kulchytsky has stressed genocidal
intentionality in the Holodomor but dated its roots and the wider all-Union famine to 1927,
prior to the Great Break economic changes in 1928–1929.36 With unequivocal confessions of
genocidal guilt lacking in nearly every suggested case, I also drew from Verdeja’s
methodological suggestion37 to overlay the perpetrators’ capacity to in ict violence with their
behavior (level of lethality, degree of coordination, and scope) in designing the proxy variables
presented later in this article. Proxy variables are of particular importance when studying
ultimate decision-makers, for as Kulchytsky reminds, Stalin was not obligated in any records to
record why he had instituted the Holodomor.38 Thus, similar to Davies and Wheatcroft,39 I also
nd the question of genocide intentionality to be central but elected to address this question
empirically through proxy variables, with my research ndings diverging from their
explanation of incompetence.40
Other alternative Holodomor interpretations question whether an ethnonational
element was present in the targeting of Ukrainians, especially in light of other famines and
violence throughout the Soviet Union.41 Some scholars counter that the 1932–1933 Holodomor
presents suf cient evidence of willful ethnonational targeting not present in other Ukrainian
famines or in the additional all-Union famines.42 In this article, I make no claims regarding other
Ukrainian famines. As I avoid ethnic targeting explanations for the violence, I also do not argue
that the Holodomor should be considered a genocide at the expense of other Soviet famines or
violence. This article’s methodology could easily be applied to other cases; this would expand
upon—rather than negate—the patterns my analysis uncovered. Regarding the position that
Stalin willfully targeted ethnic Ukrainians, this argument is often undertaken by those
exploring whether the Holodomor adheres to the 1948 United Nations de nition of genocide.43
The de nition’s notable exclusion of groups like political and economic groups has long been
critiqued44 but elevates the importance of ethnic motivations for those seeking international
genocide recognition for the Holodomor. This article is not intended to re-address the
compatibility of the Holodomor with the United Nation’s de nition, as this debate has been

34

Verdeja, Political Science, 310.

35

Ibid.

36

Kulchytsky, Famine 1932–1933, xx, 29.

37

Verdeja, Political Science, 310.

38

Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Why Did Stalin Exterminate the Ukrainians? Comprehending the Holodomor: The Position of
Soviet Historians, Part 4,” The Day Weekly Digest no. 37, November 22, 2005, accessed December 1, 2019, https://
www.usubc.org/AUR/aur621.php#a4.

39

Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 441.

40

While an extended summary of this debate is beyond this article’s scope, I note other dissenting voices who generally
concur with Davis and Wheatcroft’s explanation of Soviet incompetence in famine deaths. See Terry Martin,
Af rmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2001); Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For another summary of genocide debates within Soviet historical circles, see
Norman M. Naimark, “Applebaum, Fitzpatrick, and the Genocide Question,” Contemporary European History 27,
no. 3 (2018), 435–439.

41

Viktor Kondrashin, “Hunger in 1932–1933: A Tragedy of the Peoples of the USSR,” Holodomor Studies 1, no. 2 (2009),
16–21, accessed September 27, 2020, https://holodomor.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2.-HolodomorScholarship-MY.pdf.

42

Klid and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, xxviv–xlv.

43

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)).

44

Verdeja, Political Science, 309.
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recently (though not exhaustively) covered by Applebaum,45 nor is it directly intended to
support or detract from other Holodomor-related political activities like commemorations, legal
judgements, or modern-day consequences like reparations. Instead, the purpose of this article is
to operationalize existing comparative genocide scholarship in the context of the Holodomor
case, with a focus on understanding how this historical case may help violence prevention
experts to rapidly make sense of complex patterns of violence in real-time. Scholarly questions
remain as to whether the “rather arbitrary distinction between victim categories”46 suggests
politicization and/or an inherent empirical aw in the United Nations de nition; I follow other
scholarly approaches that encourage empirically-based innovation regarding group
characterization.47
In dealing with the complex question of Holodomor-era Ukrainian identity, several
considerations guided my approach. Liber utilizes “majority Ukrainian-speaking territories”48
terminology in his study, clarifying that “this does not presuppose a developed national
consciousness…nor does it imply an ‘ethnically pure’ Ukrainian population.”49 Stating that
peasant identity was likely stronger than Ukrainian identity—with the exception of urban
Ukrainophile movement representatives50—he argues that social position and religious
adherence were key factors in de ning one’s self-identi cation.51 A 1926 census found 90
percent of the rural population self-identifying as Ukrainian, with 81 percent of Ukraine’s 29
million residing in rural areas,52 a factor that helps to explain the extensive cultural heritage
destruction of the Holodomor53 even without subscribing to purely ethnic Ukrainian
motivations. During this period, Ukrainian self-identi cation was further complicated by
debates over relationships between smaller sub-ethnicities, ever-present language distinctions,
and Ukrainian spread over various political empires
While contextually helpful, genocide scholarship has long-focused the question of
group membership as “de ned by the perpetrator.”54 Under Lenin’s New Economic Policy, a
divide-and-conquer strategy separated rural laborers into three economic classes (kulaks,
seredniaks, and bedniaks), a tactic Kulchytsky argues was intended to encourage strife, reduce
uni ed resistance, and discourage collective identity development.55 The broader debates of
Lenin and Stalin’s views on nationality policy are beyond the scope of this article, but a
prevailing interpretation of Lenin’s pragmatist approach has included the paci cation of
Ukrainian peasantry by allowing state participation.56 When Stalin consolidated power, “a
mode of hybrid Soviet identity crystalized, rooted in both nationality and perceived class

45

Applebaum, Red Famine, 346–360.

46

Verdeja, Political Science, 309.

47

For examples of this approach, see Straus, Destroy Them, 552–555; Mark Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Larry May, Genocide: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).

48

Liber, Total Wars, xvi.

49

Ibid.

50

Plokhy, Gates of Europe, 159–188.

51

Liber, Total Wars, 12–28.

52

Ibid., 145.

53

Olga Andriewsky, “Towards a Decentered History: The Study of the Holodomor and Ukrainian Historiography,” in
Contextualizing the Holodomor: The Impact of Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies, eds. Andrij Makuch and Frank
Sysyn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2015), 39–40; Kristina Hook, “‘When the Ukrainian
World Was Destroyed:’ Genocidal Narrative Convergence and Stakeholder Interactions during National Crises,”
(PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2020), 44–87, https://curate.nd.edu/show/jw827943j9c.

54

Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), 35.

55

Kulchytsky, Famine 1932–1933, 26–30.

56

Ibid., 26–30; Graziosi, Soviet Famines, 100. See also, Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the
Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Martin, Af rmative Action Empire.
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origins…Ukrainian nationality and agricultural identity—kulak, seredniak, or bedniak.”57
Along this interpretation, Stalin’s efforts to supersede the NEP involved taking on the dual,
intertwined threats that Ukrainian lands posed: economic and national. Peasant resistance
shifted rural self-perceptions; the lines between the wealthier kulaks and lower economic
classes blurred as a more cohesive resistance was achieved. Graziosi summarizes an indivisible
linkage between class and nationality in crystalizing the perpetrator-de ned category of
Holodomor-era Ukrainian by stating, “at least up to 1933, the national question was the peasant
question.”58 With Stalin’s push to actualize socialism across all fronts, it is reasonable to infer—
as I do in the proxy variables presented later—that perpetrator perceptions of “Ukrainian”
developed into the economic-national category of those strongly resisting their recasting as
bene cial Soviet citizens and likely included a variety of minority groups residing in Ukrainian
lands.59 Such a point is especially helpful to emphasize here, as the perpetrator-driven
Ukrainian/Soviet distinction exists separately to Ukrainian ethnic membership and does not
correlate precisely to Ukrainian/non-Ukrainian surnames in the surveyed documents
Overcoming the Challenges of De ning and Assessing Genocide
Debates over the Nature and Measurement of Genocide
As referenced, the Holodomor is important for scholars operating across academic elds60 and
for those seeking legal and/or political redress for long-suppressed crimes, a dynamic related to
genocide’s powerful symbolic capital. The shocking brutality of the Nazi regime against more
than six million Jews and other populations in uenced its special moral authority, even in
comparison to other acts of barbarity like war crimes or crimes against humanity. The dark side
of technological and industrial advancements—which facilitated the Nazis’ horri c killing
ef ciency—shattered optimism,61 while burgeoning mass media spread visual proofs of the
Holocaust into ordinary homes and shaped popular understandings of genocide.62 The subject
of genocide today remains a highly contested yet morally powerful category used by a range of
professionals (e.g., advocacy activists, policymakers, journalists, politicians, lawyers, etc.).
Especially important for contested, long-suppressed cases like the Holodomor, clarifying that
multiple actors employ varying working de nitions for a variety of purposes—ranging from
the political, legal, remembrance, and academic—must be stated upfront
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Amber N. Nickell, “Book Review: The Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: An Anatomy of the Holodomor, by Stanislav
Kulchytsky,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 61, no. 4 (2019), 458.

58

Graziosi, Soviet Famines, 100. See also, Hennadii Ye menko, “The Kremlin’s Nationality Policy in Ukraine after the
Holodomor of 1932–1933,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1 (2008), 69–70.
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For the purpose of this analysis, I draw a distinction between debates over the Ukrainian genocide question in two
important academic elds: those occurring within Soviet Union historical studies and those within comparative
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prioritizing deep interpretation of documents in their chronological context of Ukraine, the region, and the Soviet
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of analysis, interpretation, and emphasis. Grounded in comparative genocide theorizing, my work is primarily
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violence patterns in the Ukrainian case and in other global contexts, past and present. Both essential to the
knowledge production process, I recognize the value of Soviet Union historical studies and comparative genocide
theorizing, while situating my analysis within the latter.
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Good faith academic disagreements over the scope and parameter of the genocide
concept have existed since genocide studies took a comparative turn in the 1970s.63 Without
negating the signi cant role of founding voices, including Raphaël Lemkin64 and Hannah
Arendt,65 some scholars have noted the powerful political processes that exerted pressure on the
speci c international law formulation of genocide terminology.66 Others urged that the
inclusion of additional cases, particularly from non-Western perspectives, should prompt an
analytic reexamination of the assumptions guiding genocide research.67 Adapting increasingly
sophisticated methodologies, alternative analytic conceptualizations, and associated variables
fostered signi cant theoretical breakthroughs. These developments also expanded the
conceptual boundaries of genocide, with Jones gathering 25 distinctive de nitions proposed by
well-known scholars.68 Legal scholars raise valid concerns about the importance of precedent
and analytical consistency. However, Jones argues persuasively that scholarly conceptual
debates are essentially consistent with internal law debates over “hard” and “soft” legal
applications.69 Some scholars have argued that the original United Nations de nition is too
rigid, thus ruling out many horri c acts that deserve the special international condemnation of
genocide terminology. Dissenters respond that over-applied references to genocide will rob it of
its moral weight and undercut preventative efforts by resulting in non-tailored responses to all
forms of mass violence
A universally accepted de nition of genocide is elusive, complicating comparability
across case studies. After reviewing seven major genocide comparative volumes, Straus stated
that “no two authors under review share the same de nition of the term [genocide], and as a
result the authors end up explaining fairly different phenomena.”70 Essential for genocide
prevention policymaking, I note one key methodological divide, referring for clarity to this
distinction as numerical thresholds or dynamics-based classi cations. Regarding the former, social
sciences like political science and psychology have increasingly emphasized the research
potential of quantitative modeling to explain social and behavioral dynamics including war,
violence, and peacebuilding.71 Some of these scholars have turned their attention to mass
murder and have opted to circumnavigate genocide de nition debates by instead comparing
various instances of high-fatality violence.72 Recognizing that the numerical categories they
propose may not fully align with traditional understandings of genocide, new conceptual
categories, like “politicide” or “political mass murder”73 have replaced strictly genocide-focused
analyses. In addition, the actual number of victim fatalities constitutes a large range, ranging
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from Bellamy’s 5,000 civilian death threshold for “mass atrocities”74 to Valentino’s “mass
killings,” which he de nes as 50,000 or more noncombatants deaths within ve years.75 Other
implicit references to genocide as related to numerical criteria have occurred in popular
historical accounts, such as Hochschild’s usage of the phrase “genocidal proportions” in
reference to colonial Belgian Congo.76
Numerical approaches can play an important role in global horizon scanning77—where
a wide rather than deep approach on mapping changes is needed—and provide important
insight on some features of violence escalation.78 However, dissenters note that foundational
understandings of genocide stress the perpetrators’ intentional efforts to annihilate entire
groups, with victim totals unspeci ed. Accordingly, as victims are selected due to their group
membership, speci c patterns across diverse cultural or chronological contexts should separate
genocide as a complex phenomenon, even compared to other severe violence.79 Genocide’s
unique dynamics may occur with high or low body counts; fatalities can include “only a few
hundred…if the targeted population is small and localized, or millions if it is large and
widespread.”80 Other scholars support this view indirectly by arguing that genocides should be
re-contextualized within broader social science literature without losing sight of what makes
this phenomenon unique,81 necessitating that distinctive dynamics both exist and can be traced.
Now-Casting and the Need for a Dynamics-Based Approac
I suggest the dynamics-based approach is best situated to meet recognized gaps within
genocide prevention research. In addition to early warning tools (which ag imminent threats of
genocide or other mass violence) and risk assessments (which track gradually emerging
accumulations of structural risks), a new push focuses on now-casting tools aimed at distilling
the chaos of mass violence while amplifying the most signi cant dynamics for policymaking as
they change in real-time.82 For this third type of tool, a framework built for dynamics-based
classi cations of mass killings is urgently needed. Taken alone, numerical counts of victims can
undercut such research goals by obscuring contextual nuance and emerging patterns, con ating
related-but-distinct forms of large-scale violence if they share similar fatality rates. While
morally deplorable, high fatality rates do not automatically indicate that an entire population
group was targeted for the extermination of genocide. Instead, dynamics-based now-casting
elicits more nuanced questions regarding victim selection, perpetrator motivation, cascading
violence scenarios, tipping points, and potentially successful violence interventions,83 while
allowing for the incorporation of cross-cultural factors that can profoundly shape the design,
monitoring, and ultimate success of an intervention. Numerical approaches capture some
aspects of change (e.g., variation in the number of fatalities across time and space). Yet they
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cannot alone tell us if such changes are genocidal (i.e., oriented toward intentional destruction)
or repressive-yet-not-genocidal—factors holding signi cant rami cations for prevention efforts
A dynamics-based now-casting approach requires engaging what separates genocide
from other forms of violence. Straus suggests consensus has clustered around two key questions
for answering this: 1) Who is targeted, and 2) for what purpose?84 Equally important, another
research trend stresses that genocides should be viewed as a process that can ebb and ow
through its occurrence (i.e., exhibiting violence not technically classi ed as genocidal at every
stage).85 Based upon this research, the spectrum of large-scale killings can be organized by
separating genocidal patterns from another non-genocidal-but-still-severe form, which I refer to
as mass directed violence,86 along the criteria of intended target and intended purpose. With reference
to intended targets, genocide is characterized by unquali ed group selection, while mass
directed violence is characterized by quali ed (i.e., partial) group selection.87 Therefore, in a
context of genocidal violence, perpetrators target every member of the threatened group,
making no distinctions by gender, age, or other features. In a mass directed violence context,
violence is still targeted along group lines, but not every member is targeted; for example,
combatants or perceived rivals from within a group may be singled out for violence.
Additionally, genocide is waged for an intended purpose of destruction, while the intended
purpose of mass directed violence falls short of this annihilating goal. The destructive violence
of genocide implies that perpetrators cannot envision a future that entails co-existing with their
victims. In contrast, the goal of mass directed violence can involve their victims alive but in a
subservient, submissive role with violence thus including repression, intimidation, or harm.
While genocides and mass directed violence do not constitute a moral hierarchy, distinguishing
between their speci c, distinctive speci c patterns of violence is essential for policy-oriented
academic research. Effective violence responses are tailored to nuanced ground dynamics and
must locate ripe moments for various types of interventions. The Holodomor case aids in theory
development by allowing historical hindsight to be juxtaposed to empirical ndings, with my
approach described below.
Methods
Research Questions and Data Consideration
As Soviet era archives opened for researchers,88 new possibilities for analyzing the longsuppressed Holodomor emerged.89 Many relevant archives in Ukraine opened to researchers in
200890 with another round of Soviet-related declassi cation in 2015.91 Other related documents
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are believed to remain in closed Russian Federation archives,92 although relevant records have
been published since Russian political independence.93 Additional written records such as
personal diaries and narrative oral accounts by survivors have also been published, providing
poignant victim viewpoints.94 These new documents have altered preexisting research
limitations, have allowed earlier scholarship to be reconsidered, and—for some scholars—have
resulted in a theoretical sea change in recent years
These documents con rm that, like other examples of mass deaths in the former
Yugoslavia, Armenia, the Holocaust, Rwanda, and elsewhere, the Ukrainian Holodomor was a
complex sociopolitical phenomenon characterized by varying levels of participation, a degree of
intentionality that continues to be contested (as will be discussed further), and multiple layers
of decision-making across a constellation of bureaucratic structures and regional authorities.
Also familiar to scholars of violence, questions of retaliation, the parameters of self-defense,
limitations on the state’s monopoly of force, and other debates add complexity to the conceptual
boundaries of “victim” categories. Without denying this reality, I elected to focus this study on
the primary records of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin who had consolidated his control over the
Soviet Union by 1932.95 With Stalin the central node of political authority, I restricted my scope
to all available correspondences directly to and from him during the period of 1932–1933 that
directly pertained to Ukraine. Aiming to include all documentation he can reasonably be
inferred as personally viewing, I added several additional directives that contain his personal
signature or that resulted in his immediate responsive action, such as ring an of cial
Both Ukraine and the Soviet Union experienced a series of famines for a variety of
reasons from the 1920s through the aftermath of World War II. Like other mass violence events
(e.g., Straus’ contention that the Rwandan genocide is best analyzed from 1990–1994),96 scholars
debate the Holodomor’s chronological duration within this broader context. While some
proponents of the genocide hypothesis in Ukraine argue that the 1920s famines or the later
1930s purges must be considered, the 1932–1933 period is the most frequently suggested
common denominator across the widest range of literature. Questions of genocide are
dependent on the overlap of the perpetrators’ motives (intentionality) and means (the ability to
carry out the violence they intend).97 This study could be expanded to include other years and
questions (such as do we see rhetorical escalations in 1931–1932 but with fewer deaths?)
without de nitely addressing genocidal questions (e.g., it is possible that Stalin’s means
emerged before his motivation, or vice versa). Thus, with the majority of scholars suggesting
that mass deaths peaked in 1932–1933 (indicating at least the possibility of genocidal means),
the question of whether motives (intentionality) can also be detected in this pivotal period is
central. Accordingly, I restricted my analysis to the seventeen authenticated documents that I
located to/from Stalin on Ukraine, dating from February 10, 1932 to October 2, 1933. Sixteen
records were originally located in Russian archives, speci cally the Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation
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(APRF), published in the rst decade of Russian independence. One additional record was
located in Ukraine’s Central State Archive of the Supreme Authorities and Governance of
Ukraine in Kyiv (TsDAVO Ukrayiny). This article relies upon my translations and the work of a
research assistant (a native speaker of Russian and Ukrainian) trained in ethnographic
translation and working under my supervision. However, other English translations of these
and other documents have also been published.98
These seventeen documents are not fully representative of the full range of decisionmaking, perpetration, or complexity. Beyond Stalin’s decision-making, this methodology could
be expanded to address a wider range of Soviet bureaucracies and regional authorities;99
shifting perpetrator/victim/bystander categories;100 or the interplay of local responses to and
participation in Soviet collectivization.101 Innovative computational tools could also adapt these
proxy variables into algorithms for more extensive coding across a greater number of
documents, such as records kept during this time period by external observers including foreign
diplomats.102 Despite these limitations, tightly centralized decision-making within the Soviet
Union and a widespread degree of institutionalized fear among the less powerful make
focusing on Stalin’s intentionality a foundational step. Fear and dread may have in uenced the
tone taken even by Stalin’s close associates when they wrote to him, necessitating a careful read
of the documents selected within their broader context. Historians have noted tonal shifts in
surviving victim private recollections from the 1920s to early 1930s as harsh repressions were
legally codi ed for discussing the famine or other topics deemed subversive.103 Still, other
scholars may adapt this methodology in creative ways to include these important local voices.
Within Holodomor historical reconstructions, a perceived change in Stalin’s decision-making
toward Ukraine was frequently agged in autumn of 1932104 (discussed later). With this
example in mind, two primary questions drove the textual approach I employed
1. Do the records surveyed support an analytic assessment of
the Holodomor as a genocide or mass directed violence,
based on the conceptual categories of intended target and
intended purpose
2. Does the framework capture change over time, including
shifts or multiple shifts (back-and-forth) across the genocide
and mass directed violence conceptual categories
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Overview of Methods Approach
To conduct this analysis, I used MAXQDA mixed methods data software, which aids in the
visualization, rapidity, and uniformity of qualitative data coding and analysis.105 With its
research design exibility, it has been successfully utilized in textual analysis containing
multiple themes and tonal characteristics, including by researchers controlling for temporal
variation. Various epistemological perspectives exist for qualitative data analysis, with
intercoder reliability an important component.106 Although grounded analysis calls for
inductive approaches, I used a deductive approach for speci c testing, also informed by
discourse analysis approaches aimed at capturing temporal variation in textual and spoken
sources. I incorporated the same native speaker and my translations for standardization and
con rmed translational consistency with native speakers for intercoder reliability. Over the
course of this project, I conducted 2.5 years of ethnographic research in Ukraine (2016–2019). I
completed extensive interviewing with diverse scholarly experts, accessed additional archival
sources, and conducted site visits to impacted locations, which provided additional context. I
employed a systematic approach to document identi cation to reduce bias in potential
selectivity of records and coded the full range of available documents before organizing the
themes and sub-themes in any way, thus reducing unconscious bias tendencies to t the data to
previously noted patterns. Finally, I developed proxy variables for the categories of intended
purpose and intended targets, a standard practice for social scienti c approaches to elusive
categories like “intentionality,”107 proxy variables that I have also employed in other
geographically diverse cases. As mentioned, Stalin’s power consolidation and the period’s
ideological monopoly left other authority gures vulnerable to crossing his of cial, de nitive
interpretations of party loyalty. To address the challenges of assessing motives in such an
environment, I drew from Verdeja’s analytic suggestions and emergent intentionality108
conception to overcome related methodological obstacles in other similar contexts

Table 1. Proxy Variables, Intended Purpose of Violenc
Intended Purpose

Proxy Variable: FutureOrientation

Proxy Variable: Violence as
Communicative
[Violence used to send
messages of fear or
intimidation]

GENOCIDE

• Destruction

• Perpetrators cannot
envision a future that
entails co-existing with
victims.

• Little to no communicative
violence

MASS
DIRECTED
VIOLENCE

• All other violence
falling below
destruction
• Repressio
• Non-destructive
harm (e.g., injuries)

• Perpetrators can
envision a future that
includes their victims in
a submissive role.

• Extensive evidence of
communicative violence

105
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Ryan and H. Russell Bernard, “Data Management and Analysis Methods,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd
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Table 2. Proxy Variables, Intended Targets of the Violenc

Intended Target

Proxy Variable:
Logistics of Violence

Proxy Variable: Pursuit of
Victims

GENOCIDE

• Unquali ed
Group Selection

• Coordinated and
Systemati
• Not ad hoc

• Pursuit (even when
inconvenient) over time
and across distance.

MASS
DIRECTED
VIOLENCE

• Quali ed
Group Selection

• Possibly coordinated
and systemati
• Possibly ad hoc

• Little to no pursuit
across time—killing may
take place in single
instance
• Little to no pursuit
across distance—victims
selected on criteria of
convenience.

Using MAXQDA, I converted these proxy variables into coding themes and sub-themes
(Image 3), recording a total of 207 themes and sub-themes. These themes aided theory
development in various ways, either by indicating the presence/absence of a speci c proxy or
by explicating additional details about the nature of the violence
Image 3. MAXQDA Codebook for Proxy Variable

The coded themes were then organized into a letter-by-letter matrix (Table 5) and code
relations were assessed (Image 6). To guide readability of the following discussion, Graph 4
contains a preview of the nal data by illustrating how the violence dynamics of the Ukrainian
Holodomor adhered more closely to a pattern of mass directed violence until an unmistakable
trend toward genocidal decision-making began in July 1932
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Graph 4. Proxy Variable Percentages Indicating Genocides or Mass Directed Violence Pattern

Violence Dynamics of the Ukrainian Holodomor:
Indications of Genocide or Mass Directed Violence
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Discussion: Case Study Findings and Results
Violence Dynamics: February 1932 through July 193
I begin with a February 10, 1932 letter109 drafted by Komsomol Secretary Pastushenko110 of the
Polonnyste village, Baban raion (district), Vinnitsa oblast (province) to Stalin. The author writes
from the perspective of envisioning the future of Ukraine, albeit one where the Soviet vision for
collectivization is more fully realized. He writes approvingly of the village of 317 homesteads
being “collectivized one hundred percent,” although he views greater Soviet transformation as
needed: “No, it’s not Soviet but completely bourgeois.”111 Writing from the perspective of a local
of cial, Pastushenko nevertheless depicts an unquali ed Ukrainian population that is resisting
class transformation. Despite his criticism, his letter indicates his ability to envision the
population alive yet more fully controlled in the future with detailed plans to ful ll the Soviet
collectivist policies and grain totals. Historian Ruslan Pyrih later noted that this village council
head was subsequently relieved of his post and expelled from the communist party after Stalin
received this letter.112
Next, Grigory Petrovsky, a once prominent Soviet politician who served as Ukraine’s
prime minister during this period and who fell out of popularity in the late 1930s,113 writes to
Stalin on June 10, 1932.114 This second letter contains six examples of quali ed (i.e., differentiated)
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references to the Ukrainian populace, distinguishing between Ukrainian communists and
Ukrainian villagers and between “poor peasants and even the middle-class farmers against our
class enemies.”115 This type of quali ed references between “good” and “bad” Ukrainians
exhibits differentiated victim selection (associated with mass directed violence); Petrovsky
appears to view some of the population as worth sparing and incorporating into the
transformed Soviet society. His letter contains ten examples of envisioning a future, with
references to building socialism’s popularity and food aid request for starvation victims.
Signi cantly, his letter hints at escalating violence patterns, including two references to
unquali ed victims of starvation along gender (men and women) and class lines (poor and
middle-class farmers). References exist to the highly coordinated policies deepening the suffering
and six references to active neglect by the authorities who knew the populations were dying,
including Petrovsky’s town meeting summary where the population asked, “Why did they [the
authorities] create an arti cial famine? After all, we had a harvest.”116 Overall, Petrovsky’s letter
portrays accelerating suffering but depicts some elements of the Ukrainian population as able to
provide valuable labor for the Soviet Union’s future. The third letter117 analyzed was also
drafted on June 10, 1932 by Vlas Chubar,118 a Ukrainian Bolshevik revolutionary-turned-Soviet
politician (the most senior Communist Party of cial in Ukraine at the time) executed during the
Great Terror. In 2010, a Ukrainian criminal court judged Chubar as among the of cials
personally responsible for the Holodomor’s organization, along with Stalin, Molotov, and
another gure in this analysis, Lazar Kaganovich.119 Chubar’s letter includes two references to a
quali ed view of Ukrainians (i.e., distinguishing between collectivized farmers and those
resisting) and six instances of violence used to intimidate (e.g., the “malicious humiliation of
private farmers”120 to harass independent landowners), all indicating mass directed violence
dynamics. Chubar also notes the unquali ed victim impacts, one reference to the pursuit of
victims, nine references to the actively destructive famine impact, and two instances hinting at a
future without Ukrainians, blurring the line between the treatment of non-resistors and resistors
to collectivization
Kaganovich, Stalin’s close associate and an administrator tasked with implementing
collectivization in Ukraine,121 forwarded both June 10 letters to Stalin with his comments on
June 12, 1932 (letter four).122 Indicating that “we will have to provide help [food aid]” although
“the question is one of scale,”123 Kaganovich envisions a future for Ukrainian famine survivors.
His letter quali es group selection, distinguishing between resisting Ukrainian peasants and
Ukrainian party leadership.124 Both proxies indicate mass directed violence dynamics, as does
Stalin’s response back to Kaganovich in the fth letter125 assessed, dated June 15, 1932. In
between invectives against Chubar and Petrovsky, Stalin indirectly concedes Kaganovich’s

115

Ibid.

116

Ibid.

117

RGASPI 82/2/139 (1932), 144–153, in Shapoval and Vasyliev, Commanders Great Famine, 206–212.

118

Shapoval and Olynyk, Holodomor: Prologue, 101.

119

Justice v. Skavronik, Ruling in the Name of Ukraine, 13 January 2010, Kyiv Court of Appeals, Criminal Division, trans.
Holodomor Victims Memorial, accessed September 2, 2019, https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/resolution-ofthe-court/.

120

RGASPI 82/2/139 (1932), 144–153, in Shapoval and Vasyliev, Commanders Great Famine, 206–212.

121

Ibid.

122

RGASPI 558/11/740 (1932), 41 in Edward Rees et al., eds., Stalin i Kaganovich: Perepyska 1931–1936 [Stalin and
Kaganovich: Correspondence 1931–1936] (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001), 164.

123

Ibid.

124

While this analysis focuses on letters written to/from Stalin, other records add contextual detail, portraying an
atmosphere in which food assistance was prioritized to revitalize needed laborers and later, to reward the
politically loyal who were still able to work. For other records outside this article’s methodological criteria, see Klid
and Motyl, Holodomor Reader, 257–262.

125

RGASPI 81/3/99 (1932), 63 in Manning et al., Tragedy Soviet Countryside, 169.

fi

fi

fi

fi

Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.15.2.1809.

fi

fi

.


fi

fi

fi

fi

fi

© 2021

26

Hook

vision of a future that includes Ukrainians by agreeing to send aid. At 522,000 poods,126 the food
aid authorized by Stalin to Ukraine is ultimately one-third of the 1.5 million poods requested,
but nevertheless indicates away from total genocidal destruction at this point. Stalin’s intention
to in ict suffering on the Ukrainian population through limited aid is clear from his statement,
“[i]n my opinion, Ukraine has been given more than enough.”127 With this comment following
his of cials’ reports of mass starvation, coupled with Stalin’s refusal to halt grain requisitions,
this statement was coded as violence to intimidate the population
Kaganovich’s response to Stalin on June 16, 1932 (letter six)128 continues envisioning a
future that includes Ukrainians, referencing their subdued-but-useful status as harvesters for the
collective grain quotas twice. Explicitly recognizing that the upcoming “harvest campaign will
be especially dif cult, particularly in Ukraine” and the “danger of premature, spontaneous and
unorganized…plundering,” Kaganovich advocates for violence to repress by recommending that
the party mobilize to prevent this outcome.129 The seventh letter, a response from Stalin to
Kaganovich and Molotov on July 2, 1932,130 includes his instructions to attend the upcoming
Ukrainian conference of communist leaders and “use all measure to win over workers’
sentiment, isolate whining and rotten diplomats (regardless of personas!) and ensure a trulyBolshevik decision” is made. Although Stalin still sees the Ukrainian population as composed of
“good” and “bad” Ukrainians (i.e., quali ed group selection), he appears to envision a future in
which Ukraine is “lost.” He writes, “Pay more serious attention to Ukraine… [Chubar and
Stanislav Kosior’s] rotten diplomacy and criminally-reckless approach to affairs will lose
Ukraine in the end.”131 This response marks the rst hint of Stalin’s emerging zero-sum thinking
and hardening view of the Ukrainian/Soviet distinction (see earlier discussion), although at this
stage he targets subduing the population through repressive violence like leadership isolation and
removal
Molotov and Kaganovich write Stalin twice on July 6, 1932. First, they report (letter
eight)132 on the repressive steps they took to subdue increasing intractable local Ukrainian
communists, referencing a future with subdued Ukrainian harvesters. For the rst time, their
letters contain unquali ed views of the troublesome Ukrainian population; the local communists
have clearly fallen out of favor. They also advocate for increasingly systemized, coordinated
collectivization plans, in spite of escalating starvation deaths. Their second telegram (letter
nine)133 has increasingly unquali ed—and unsatis ed—views of the Ukrainian population and
the local leaderships’ “shortcomings.” They reference the ongoing famine’s “grave conditions”
but recommend to Stalin that the Soviet elites “maintain a reserved tone…to avoid feeding the
foreign press.”134 This overt, active neglect of the accelerating starvation fatalities suggests
willful choices to allow mass destruction of the Ukrainian people under Soviet jurisdiction.
Stalin’s short response (letter ten) on July 15, 1932 references a urry of leadership changes to
grasp control.135 This cleaning house process indicates the growing degree of direct systematic
and coordinated control of Ukraine, although no indication exists that greater control was used to
alleviate the escalating famine-related fatality rates
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Violence Dynamics: August 1932 through October 193
Around August 1932, this methodology ags abrupt upticks in genocidal proxy variables. On
August 11, 1932, Stalin’s writing (letter eleven) drops all differentiated references to various
“good” or “bad” elements in Ukrainian society, replaced by seven unquali ed descriptions of the
populace.136 Stalin’s usage of the word “Ukraine” itself takes on a new collective tone;
individualized references to various groups no longer appear. He suggests an upcoming “battle
with the counterrevolution in such a large and distinct republic as Ukraine,” initiating a framing
of the entire republic of Ukraine as an opposing collective, while stating that Ukraine is a
“unique republic”137 in his Soviet empire. Six examples of imagining a future without Ukraine
were coded in this letter, including “if we do not correct the situation in Ukraine immediately,
we will lose Ukraine.”138 Stalin further instructs Kaganovich, “Set yourself the goal of turning
Ukraine into a fortress of the USSR, a real model republic, within the shortest possible time.
Don’t spare money for this purpose. Without these and similar measures (economic and
political strengthening of Ukraine starting with the raions [districts] along the border, etc.), I
repeat once again: we will lose Ukraine.”139 Other genocidal proxy variables coded in this letter
include six instances of Stalin’s growing systematic and coordinated control over Ukraine and
three instances categorized as active neglect/willful destruction of the famine’s now-catastrophic
impact on the Ukrainian population
Kaganovich’s August 16, 1932 response (letter twelve) includes two direct references to
envisioning a future without Ukrainians.140 He suggests bringing “other workers, fresh blood…for
Ukraine,”141 referring to the soon-initiated massive resettlement program that brought Russians,
Belarussians, and other Soviet citizens into Ukrainian territories.142 Kaganovich twice references
increasing coordination and systemization and ten unquali ed, negative references to the Ukrainian
character. He complains, “Truth be told, the people [Ukrainians] are not the same; I previously
knew them to be different; they have gradually changed for the worse, in other words, changed
considerably as a result of ‘softness’ and ‘lightness of management.’”143 The once-differentiated
Ukrainian communists are termed “bacteria eating away”144 at the Party’s leadership. In this
letter, he views even Ukrainian communists as threatening uni ed Soviet rule, hinting at the
Ukrainian/Soviet distinction explained elsewhere. Perhaps re ecting Stalin’s similar tonal shift,
genocidal proxy variables increase
The thirteenth surviving letter picks up with Kaganovich writing to Stalin on December
22, 1932.145 He shares news of increased coordination and systemization of the upcoming grain
procurement plan, which proved deadly. Seven references to a future without Ukrainians appear,
the majority related to seizures of seed and grain reserves. Kaganovich argues, “We are
convinced that this ‘preoccupation’ with reserves, including seed reserves is seriously
hampering and undermining the entire grain procurement plan.”146 With the government’s
knowledge of the mass deaths,147 Kaganovich’s request to take the reserves—the agricultural
136
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foundation of next year’s harvest—strongly indicates that a future with empty, populationdepleted lands was an intentional Soviet policy choice. A week later, on December 29, 1932, the
OGPU, the Soviet Union’s secret police, issued a report to Stalin on the success of village
deportations (letter fourteen).148 As gulag149 organizers, OGPU involvement indicates
heightened systemization for dealing with Ukrainians, including in the Kuban region.
Documentation of several thousand families deported to the harsh Ural Mountains (often an
indirect death sentence) indicate a Soviet future with Ukrainians removed, not simply subdued
Famine conditions deteriorated, indicated by Stalin’s January 22, 1933 order (letter
fteen) to prevent the escape of “mass ight of peasants ‘for bread.’”150 The inconvenient
pursuit of victims is signi cant for indicating genocidal dynamics (i.e., the victims’ unpursued
ight would have satis ed the repressive goal of mass directed violence). Genocide’s
unquali ed, destructive logic necessitates that victims be hunted, caught, and destroyed, a
pattern emerging in this document.151 As eeing Ukrainian peasants were captured and forcibly
returned, soldiers sealed their villages to in ict quick mass casualty rates.152 Nine reference
indicating a future vision in which Ukrainians no longer exist were recorded in this document,153 as
Ukrainian starvation-driven out-migration was sabotaged and prevented. Four systematic
coordination proxy variables indicate extensive pre-planning of the mass killings
On February 2, 1933, a sixteenth letter154 is authored by Generikh Yagoda, soon after
promoted to NKVD (Soviet intelligence and security agency) chief due to his ef cient
management of the “Ukraine situation.”155 Yagoda informs Stalin of success in “preventing the
mass exodus of villagers from the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]”156 as well as the
Northern Caucasus and Belarussian SSR, where many Ukrainian population clusters were
located. Thirteen instances of highly systematic coordination and ten references to a future without
Ukrainians are coded. Fourteen references indicate the far-reaching pursuit of victims, including
“organized cordons and search groups on the following roadways: N. Caucasus, Ukraine,
South-Eastern Western, Ryazan, Ural, Zlatoustovk, Oktiabrsk, Moscow-Kazan, MoscowBelarus-Baltic.”157 The militarized prevention of famine-driven Ukrainian out-migration, forced
repatriation, and village con nements until the victims starved to death158 are major factors in
the story of the Holodomor and the evidentiary case for genocide
The seventeenth and nal letter159 in this analysis offers a tragic post-script to Yagoda's
report. Eight months later on October 2, 1933, Kaganovich updates Stalin on the “resettlement
committee for 1933.”160 With Ukrainian lands now experiencing widespread depopulation to
famine fatalities, Stalin resettles “15,000 to 20,000 families [from Russia, Belarus, and other
Soviet lands] to Ukraine's Steppe.”161 While Ukrainian famine victims’ petitions for grain aid
were repeatedly denied or lessened by Stalin, these new, non-Ukrainian settlers were the
148
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bene ciaries of a centralized campaign that prepared for them by “organiz[ing] house and all
necessary equipment...and secur[ing] food.”162 This document adds to other documentation that
indicates the Soviet government singled out Ukraine by not providing the same food aid as
their neighbors.163
Implications for Theory and Further Testing
Kaganovich’s October 1933 letter to Stalin is the last available document for this analysis,
although starvation and resettlement waves of other Soviet citizens into Ukrainian lands
continued for several more years before World War II’s outbreak.164 Although covering a short
time period—February 1932 to October 1933—an intriguing pattern emerges in the coded data.
Table 5 shows the 207 themes organized in a letter-by-letter matrix according to genocidal or
mass directed violence patterns
Table 5. Letter-by-Letter Matrix with Number of Proxy Variable Appearances, Organized by Violent Phenomen

Color Code: Intended Purpose Proxies / Intended Targets Proxies
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With the data organized (see also Graph 4), mass directed violence clusters (e.g.,
envisioned futures with Ukrainian existence, violence to repress and subdue) appear in nearly
each of the rst eight letters, i.e., until July 6, 1932. Each of the ten total references to “quali ed
group selection” appear during this time window. Some scattered proxy indicators for genocide
appear; however, they are isolated to the missives by Stalin’s subordinates, Petrovsky and
Chubar. Falling mainly in the “active neglect/destruction” category, potential explanations
include their positionality and potential desire to impress Stalin through tough-sounding
language. In context, they are describing the Holodomor’s ongoing destructive toll but are
requesting food aid from Stalin. While actively neglectful and dismissive of mass suffering, the
larger context hints that radicalized genocidal intentionality may not accurately characterize
their behavior or discourse at this stage. According to the data, a stronger case for genocidal
dynamics materializes around the timing of Stalin’s August 11, 1932 letter.165 Often cited in
Holodomor genocide evaluations, my analysis further contextualizes this letter with proxy
variable coding suggesting that this letter was connected to broader shifts in Stalin’s decisionmaking and trends strengthened by his close associates. After this letter, mass directed violence
proxy variables abruptly drop off. Signi cant on its own, it is also striking that genocidal proxy
variables surge in quantity at this historical moment, illustrated by a clean break around letter
eleven.166 Historiographies add nuance and additional explanations to these patterns. The
minutes of two Party conference meetings have been analyzed, with some historians suggesting
Moscow-based policy decision-making between July 1932 and February 1933 worsened famine
dynamics as a tool to destroy Kharkiv (eastern Ukraine) as a sub-center of power.167 Relatedly,
Graziosi has discussed changes in enforcing procurement and related harvest spikes which
contextualize the patterns I suggest.168 Finally, variations in unquali ed or quali ed descriptors
raise important questions about center/periphery relations, imperial-colonial undertones, and
the potential diversity of perspectives and policy choices among Union and republic
authorities.169
Finally, using MAXQDA code relations processing, I explored theme relationships. Each
signi cant code relation agged (Image 6) constitute genocide-to-genocide proxy variable
clustering or mass directed violence theme clustering (square size visually depicts the numbers
cited here). Perhaps due to its extreme nature, the most signi cant relations existed between
genocide proxies. In particular, a relationship was noted between “cannot envision a future”
[Cann] (intended purpose) to “coordinated and systemized” [Coor] (intended target) violence;
these variables co-occurred together 31 times. Lesser relationships were noted between “cannot
envision a future” (intended purpose) and “unquali ed group selection” [Unqu] (intended
target), which co-occurred 17 times, as well as between “cannot envision a future” (intended
purpose) and “pursuit of victims” [Pursui] (intended target), which co-occurred 19 times. “Ad
165
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hoc violence” (mass directed violence) does not appear in any letter; however, it is not certain
that small-scale, lower-level instances would have been raised to the highest leadership levels of
the Soviet Union
Image 6. MAXQDA Code Relations of Genocide and Mass Directed Violence Proxies

Subject to additional testing, my approach yielded results that con rm the signi cance
of a framework that distinguishes between genocides and mass directed violence according to
the intended purpose and target characteristics suggested by other scholars.170 Proxy variable
clustering indicates the promise of this empirical approach and the potential to apply it to other
cases in diverse geographic contexts, historical and contemporary. As referenced, additional
analyses, including automated algorithm-based studies, could widen the scope of analysis. Still,
both research questions posed indicate af rmative answers. First, the records surveyed,
centered on Joseph Stalin, support analytic assessments of the Holodomor as a genocide
beginning around July to August 1932 as assessed according to intended targets and intended
purposes. Second, Holodomor violence does shift across the conceptual boundaries of genocide.
This nding—that speci c dynamics-based patterns can be micro-mapped within the broader
chronological context—illustrates empirical sensitivity and demonstrates a dynamics-based
now-casting approach to tracing complex violence in real-time. The brunt of Holodomor deaths
occurred in an exceedingly compressed timeframe, yet this short timeframe still allowed for the
violence to morph in pattern and form. Taken alone, numerical victim assessments may have
missed this pattern shift, an omission with negative implications for intervention activities that
are best tailored to speci c dynamics and initiated at a precise ripe moment.
Conclusion
This analysis has demonstrated a way to operationalize existing literature that calls for
genocides to be traced as a process and a phenomenon that can be distinguished from other
forms of large-scale violence.171 De nitional quagmires once incentivized primarily quantitative
approaches to many forms of large-scale violence. While helpful for certain questions, this
article supports new calls for a third type of genocide policy-relevant monitoring tool, nowcasting, that draws from mixed qualitative and quantitative approaches.172 Grounded in the
view that large-scale violence can be diagnosed according to its presenting symptoms—
including as these patterns change—the Holodomor case illustrates how this approach can
more accurately ag evolving trends even within a compressed time period. Consequently, this
approach can foster more carefully calibrated preventive responses by identifying additional
nuances in violence dynamics, perpetrator decision-making, and possible spectrums of
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outcomes. While the conceptual seeds of this approach sprouted ten years ago,173 I have
outlined a new methodology to operationalize this theorizing. Analyzing the historical
Holodomor case through this methodological lens resulted in af rmative answers to the posed
research questions and a clustering of proxy variables. It also empirically demonstrated the
emergence of a key change in the Holodomor’s violence dynamics, a shift also supported by
historical approaches. This article’s proxy variables coding approach was able to triangulate
violence shifts by organizing and highlighting major patterns during precise historical
moments. As this methodology and accompanying proxy variables can be translated into
algorithms, increased speed for tracing the day-by-day process of violence and pinpointing
major pattern shifts over periods of time is possible
Several additional implications follow. Ultimately, the empirical approach I took
concurs with other academics174 who have labeled the Holodomor a genocide, thus
underscoring this case’s importance to the comparative genocide studies eld. More tightly
focused than longer-view historiographies or legal analyses, I nevertheless reach a concurring
conclusion. In addition, while the Holodomor occurred nearly 100 years ago, the conceptual
and methodological approach I took in this analysis can be applied to ongoing, contemporary
acts of mass killing. Building on this reality, speci c policy proposals that are tailored to
genocidal or mass directed violence patterns are needed. Just as different pharmaceutical
remedies are needed for diverse pathologies, our eld must also tailor its prevention policy
recommendations and toolkits for diverse manifestations of large-scale violence
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